Key Challenges and Opportunities in Developing the Altair Lunar Lander

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The Integrated Challenge



Create a lander design based on the limitations of physics and human performance...

...that balances performance, cost, risk and reliability of the lander project, and

...that exists within the integrated architecture performance, cost profile, schedule, and integrated risk/ reliability targets of the Constellation Program, and

...that fulfills the policy direction of NASA's strategic plan, Congressional Authorization Acts, and Administrative/ OMB policy and budget guidance



Lunar Lander Basics



Lander must perform large delta-V maneuvers

- ~1000 m/sec Lunar Orbit Insertion
- ~2000 m/sec Descent and Landing
- ~2000 m/sec Ascent and Rendezvous
- Lander must sustain a crew of 4 for up to 7 days on the surface
- Lander must meet significant safety and reliability requirements
 - A significant fraction of Constellation's LOC and LOM targets
- > opportunity → use many of the lessons learned from the Apollo program
- ❑ challenge → the lander "looks like the LM"/ appears to "lack innovation"/ doesn't resemble the Millennium Falcon





Apollo and Altair By the Numbers



By the Numbers	Apollo Lunar Module	Altair Lunar Lander	
Crew Size (max)	2	4	
Surface Duration (max)	3 days	7 days (Sortie missions), Up to 210 days (Outpost missions)	
Landing site capability	Near side, equatorial	Global	
Stages	2	2	
Overall height	7.04 m (23.1 ft.)	9.75 m (32.0 ft.)	
Width at tanks	4.22 m (13.8 ft.)	8.8 m (28.9 ft.)	
Width at footpad centers (diag.)	9.45 m (31 ft.)	13.5 m (44.3 ft.)	
Crew module pressurized volume	6.65 m3 (235 cu. ft.)	17.5 m ³ (618 cu. ft.) – crew module + airlock	
Ascent Stage mass	4,805 kg (10,571 lbs.)	6141 kg (13,510 lbs.)	
Ascent Stage engines	1 – UDMH-NTO	1 – MMH-NTO	
Ascent engine thrust	15.6 Kn (3,500 lbf.)	24.5 Kn (5,500 lbf.)	
Descent Stage mass	11,666 kg (25,665 lbs.)	37,045 kg (81,500 lbs.)	
Descent Stage engines	1 – UDMH-NTO	1 - pump-fed, throttling, LOX/LH2	
Descent engine thrust	44.1 Kn (9,900 lbf.)	83.0 Kn (18,650 lbf.)	







Apollo LM and Altair



Apollo LM

- "Eagle"
- Some preliminary design studies in the years leading up to the Apollo program
- Constraints: schedule, mass, cost
- ~7 years from start of design to first crewed flight
- Performs deorbit, landing, ascent
- Single configuration (sortie)
- 4 landing legs
- 2 stages
- Crew stands during flight

<u>Altair</u>

- "Altair" = brightest star in the Eagle constellation (Aquila)
- Extensive design studies, especially over the past 20 years
- Constraints: Risk, mass, cost, schedule
- ~12 years from start of preliminary design (2008) to scheduled first crewed flight (2020)
- Performs LOI (with Orion), deorbit, landing, ascent, disposal
- Separate modules configurable for sortie, cargo and crewed outpost mission
- 4 landing legs
- 2 stages
- Crew stands during flight





- Both the LM and Altair are "physics machines" their primary roles are to provide velocity changes to their systems, operate in the space environment and support human crewmembers.
 - Physics rules
- Technology has advanced incrementally since Apollo, but not in areas that will significantly open up new design solutions
 - Much greater computational power/kg, but this system is <<1% of the vehicle mass
 - Some improvements in structures (composites) will have some effect
 - Little improvement in propulsion technology
- If physics remains fixed and technology has improved only incrementally, the design solutions will only improve incrementally
 - We <u>really</u> wanted this lander to look like the Millenium Falcon, but physics dictates much of its form
- The guys who designed the LM were pretty smart.





 Do we have the right/optimum design? (configuration, innovative solutions, technology choices, lowest mass)

- Opportunity → Current configuration is an outcome of risk-based design
- ➢ Opportunity → 2018 first flight schedule gives us ample opportunity to explore innovative internal and external configurations







- Delta-V large velocity changes for lunar descent, ascent
 - Large LOI velocity change with CEV attached
- Propellant tank size
 - Large H2 tanks packaging challenge
- Launch shroud diameter and length
 - "building a ship in a bottle"
- Launch and TLI loads control buckling, bending and stack frequencies
- c.g. control packaging propellant, stages and payloads to keep c.g. on/near centerline for vehicle control
- Ascent duration, life support, power, returned payload
- "Fire in the hole"
- Abort capabilities throughout all mission phases
- Crew access (both among modules and to surface)
- Cargo unloading and access
- Crew visibility for landing, docking



Lander Concept Timeline









- Altair took a true risk informed design approach, starting with a minimum functionality design and adding from there to reduce risk.
- Lunar Design Analysis Cycle (LDAC) 1 developed a "minimum functional" vehicle.
 - "Minimum Functionality" is a design philosophy that begins with a vehicle that will perform the mission, and no more than that
 - Does not consider contingencies
 - Does not have added redundancy ("single string" approach)
 - Provides early, critical insight into the overall viability of the end-to-end architecture
 - Provides a starting point to make informed cost/risk trades and consciously buy down risk
 - <u>A "Minimum Functionality" vehicle is NOT a design that would ever be</u> <u>contemplated as a "flyable" design!</u>
- LDAC-2 determined the most significant contributors to loss of crew (LOC) and the optimum cost/risk trades to reduce those risks.
- LDAC-3 assessed the biggest contributors to loss of mission (LOM) and optimum cost/risk trades to reduce those risks.
- Goal of the design process is to do enough real design work to understand and develop the requirements for SRR, and to mature the lander design in-house through SDR.



Lunar Lander Summary Schedule







Summary LDAC-2 Results: Probability of Loss of Crew, Mass Available for Payload





Note: P(LOC) based on simplified models and identified risk



Altair Project Lander Configuration and Performance Maturation using Risk-Based Design



	"Minimum Functional" design 8.4 m Ares V shroud, 45 t control mass"Safety Enhanced" 10 m Ares V shroud"Reliability Enhanced" Design maturation						
LLPO Desigr	n Cycle:	LDAC-1	LDAC-1A	LDAC-2	LDAC-3		
Sortie Mission							
As	cent Module	5,340 kg	5,075 kg	5,300 kg	6,494 kg		
На	nb Module	1,843 kg	949 kg (Airlock only)	1,053 kg (Airlock only)	1,173 kg (Airlock only)		
De	escent Module	33,976 kg	32,718 kg	33,845 kg	33,483 kg		
PN	/IR	3,511 kg	2,858 kg	3,130 kg	2,008 kg		
Un	nallocated	331 kg	3,652 kg	1,671 kg	1,254 kg		
Cargo Mission							
De	escent Module	33,743 kg	34,248 kg	35,656 kg	37,177 kg		
PN	/IR	2,304 kg	1,974 kg	2,135 kg	2,003 kg		
Un	nallocated	14,136 kg	17,378 kg	15,808 kg	14,794 kg		
Crew to Outpo	st Mission						
As	cent Module	5357 ka	5.356 ka	5.525 kg	6.763 kg		
De	escent Module	33.868 kg	32.684 kg	33.711 kg	33.099 kg		
PN	/IR	3.009 kg	2.691 kg	2.940 kg	1.899 kg		
Un	nallocated	2,766 kg	4,269 kg	2,824 kg	2,653 kg		





- Alternate Descent Module Configuration Study
- Alternate Ascent Module & Airlock Configuration Study
- Alternate AM/DM separation analysis and concepts
- Design for structural stiffness
- Descent Module tank residuals
- Human piloting capability maturation
- OpsCon/Ops Timeline maturation
- Refine mass threats list
- Spacecraft "safe" configuration for critical faults
- (27 more prioritized from a master list of 210+ outstanding tasks)





Descent Main Engine (DME) development

• Deep-throttling DME in current ETDP technology portfolio

Multiple-tank liquid level control

 Avoid uneven draining of low-density fluids in low acceleration environments → contained in ETDP portfolio

Propellant cryo scavanging

Use residual prop for surface fuel cell power → contained in ETDP portfolio

Ascent main engine reliability

- Build upon Orion service module engine development
- Integrated lander c.g. control
- Lander Ascent Stage c.g. control
- Stack Frequency during TLI Burn
 - Stiffness of the Altair vehicle, the interface to Orion, and to Ares V





- Lack of human spacecraft design and development expertise within NASA
 - We simply don't have enough turnover of large human spaceflight projects to consistently train spacecraft developers
 - Spacecraft are typically developed by industry, with NASA insight/oversight
 - ➢ Opportunity → Altair taking design past SDR, bringing on contractors to mature the design
 - ➢ Opportunity → Use Apollo LM experience, robotic lander experience, STS and ISS development experience
- Ramping up a project at the same time that Orion and Ares I are peaking in development
 - Competition for resources
 - Peer projects at different parts of their lifecycles (how to create IRDs, how to keep requirements from becoming the "problem" of the less mature project)

Reserves and Margin

• What is the right level of MGA and PMR for a specific point in a project lifecycle



Performance Maturity Measure – "Unallocated Differential"



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- As the Altair design moves through its initial DAC cycles, performance is measured as "Unallocated Differential" (UD), the difference between basic mass (with MGA) and Control Mass (less PMR)
- UD is Altair's measure of mass consumed by vehicle maturity as the design moves through the DACs, from "minimally functional" to "fully functional"



