Masters with Masters 22 (David Oberhettinger and Michael Bell)
On July 24, 2014, Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Chief Knowledge Officer Michael Bell and Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Chief Knowledge Officer David Oberhettinger sat down with NASA Chief Knowledge Officer Ed Hoffman for a Masters with Masters discussion about the evolution of knowledge capture at the agency. The event, “Twenty-Five Years of Transforming Lessons Learned at NASA,” was held at KSC.
The men agreed on the importance of capturing lessons learned from past missions to benefit future endeavors. “You’ve got to capture the knowledge so that it can be used next time,” said Oberhettinger. “You don’t want to fail over the things that you supposedly knew how to do.”
Read More:
http://appel.nasa.gov/2014/10/27/masters-with-masters-the-ongoing-evolution-of-lessons-learned-at-nasa/
Visit the Knowledge Management Website:
http://km.nasa.gov/
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