Risk #11398 Altair Lunar Lander Descent Main Engine Deep Throttle Characteristics
Kendall Brown, Tony Kim and Gregg Jones discus Knowledge Based Risk (KBR) 11398
Segments:
00m00s Risk Identification
02m07s Risk Context
08m53s Risk Mitigation
17m55s Solving Chug With Injector Designs
20m04s Solving Chug On The RL-10
23m24s Lessons Learned
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