Risk #11934 SSP: On Orbit Reinforced Carbon Carbon Repair
Scott Parazynski, Ben Greene and Alvaro Rodriguez discuss risks and lessons learned from On-Orbit Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Repair.
Segments:
00m00s Introduction
02m04s Context and Risk Statement
15m52s Risk Mitigation
21m49s Lessons Learned – Organization and Teamwork
27m21s Lessons Learned – Civil Servants Hands On Role
28m40s Lessons Learned – COTS Hardware
30m00s Lessons Learned – Verification Planning: Facilities
33m35s Lessons Learned – Supply Chain
34m38s Lessons Learned – Verification Approach: Use of DRMs
36m04s Lessons Learned – Verification: Analysis Versus Testing
39m35s Lessons Learned – Parallel Design Options
40m56s Lessons Learned – Crew Training
43m30s Lessons Learned – Real-Time Risk Characterization
53m33s Lessons Learned – Systems Safety Hazard Reports
57m51s Key Personal Takeways: Trust And Teamwork
1h04m40s Key Personal Takeways: Debris Free Baseline
1h07m46s RCC Repair Hardware Demo
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